Special Jurisprudence and Normative Theories: Distinguishing Between Evaluative and Prescriptive Theories
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Abstract
This article aims to bring to the spotlight the distinction between evaluative theories and prescriptive theories regarding a specific area of law—a distinction that a recently formulated classification fails to make. The difference between evaluative and prescriptive theories is significant because only the latter are subject to the “feasibility constraint” or the principle that “ought implies can.” In addition to demonstrating the importance of distinguishing between these two types of theory, the article discusses certain implications of the feasibility constraint for prescriptive theories concerning areas of law.
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